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ABSTRACT 
 
As privatisation of railway systems reach the political agendas in a number of countries, 
the separation of track infrastructure from train operations is seen as providing the vehicle 
which will improve profitability within the rail industry. This paper deals with three main 
issues related to such separation within a freight railway focus, namely: investment 
appraisal; track standards and maintenance; and train operating performance. The 
conflicts of interest between the owners of track and their client operators are discussed in 
detail. Costs related to track capacity and congestion need to be taken into account, given 
that additional trains are likely to lead to increased risk of delays to existing services. The 
paper discusses the use of a travel time reliability model to estimate the additional costs 
imposed on the system through the introduction of specific train services. 
 
 It is concluded that investment in individual elements of railway infrastructure must be 
integrated with the overall financial and customer service strategies of both operators and 
owners. As an alternative to current practices, a hybrid model of track ownership is put 
forward here. Under such a model, a joint-venture company with equity from the main 
‘players’ would be the owner of track. This would allow some of the benefits of vertical 
integration to be retained, whilst providing fair access to new operators.  
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BACKGROUND 
 
Rail transport in Australia represents about 1 percent of GDP, with freight revenues of 
just under $A3 billion annually. Although Australian rail systems have achieved 
considerable productivity gains in the last decade, unit operating costs are still well below 
world’s best practice. In 1991/92 total operating costs were estimated to be about 38 
percent below overseas industry benchmarks. (Bureau of Industry Economics 1993). 
 
To enhance profitability, accountability has been increased by various means including 
‘horizontal’ separation of the functions of the railways into various operating units which 
reflect specific markets, such as freight and passenger services. It is argued that the 
financial burden of the track and related infrastructure, such as signalling and control 
systems, should not be borne by an enterprise which is to be run on a purely commercial 
basis. As a result, infrastructure provision is increasingly seen as a separate business to be 
managed, planned and owned by a different entity. Such vertical separation is seen as 
providing the vehicle which will improve accountability and profitability within the rail 
industry. This paper deals with three main issues related to rail infrastructure ownership 
and operation, namely: investment appraisal; track standards and maintenance; and train 
operating performance. Figure 1 highlights those issues diagramatically. Although the 
paper draws mainly on research undertaken, and experience gained, within the Australian 
freight rail sector, most of the conclusions have wider application. 
 
There is a world-wide trend towards increased pressures on rail track infrastructure 
through increases in axle loads and train speeds. Such productivity and customer service 
driven  pressures inevitably lead to reductions in the life of track components and 
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increases in track maintenance costs. The conflicts of interest between the owner of track 
and his client operators are discussed in detail, particularly in the context of track 
maintenance and standards, as well as access costs. Finally, the paper discusses the use of 
a timetable and train reliability model which can be used to estimate the additional costs 
imposed on the system through the introduction of specific train services. 
 
For the purposes of this paper the main rail infrastructure elements under discussion are 
the track, associated trackside signalling/communications equipment, and the train 
control function. 
 
TRACK OWNERSHIP MODELS 
 
Two main ownership models are emerging in practice, namely: the vertically integrated 
railway with or without separate internal business units; and the vertically separated 
railway with track infrastructure managed and owned separately from multiple operators. 
The separation model has been adopted or proposed in some countries, notably in Great 
Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweeden (Nash & Preston 1994; Jansson & 
Cardebring 1989). The European Union has a policy of moving towards the separation 
model (Nash & Preston 1994).  A similar approach is under consideration for inter-State 
freight in Australia, following the competition related proposals adopted by Federal and 
State governments ( Hilmer et al. 1993). Figure 2 highlights the main features of these 
two models.  
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Under the vertically integrated model, operators and track owners tend to have a customer 
-service provider relationship. the infrastructure provider exists to service the needs of its 
client(s). The latter may consist of several business units such as passenger services and 
various types of freight services. In some cases, each business group ‘owns’ its own track 
segments, which are divided amongst operators on the basis of major user. User charges 
may be levied to non-main users using an internal cost transfer system designed to 
achieve accountability and ‘value for money’ outcomes. It is argued that one of the 
drawbacks of the vertically integrated model, is its inability to readily and fairly 
accommodate new entrants in the form of operating competitors, sharing a common track 
infrastructure. If existing railway systems are publicly owned, it is possible to open up 
track to new entrants through direct intervention by governments. However, the question 
of fairness in dealing with potential competitors, would require strict contractual 
arrangements related to costs and service quality. The terms and operating conditions of 
track access need to extend to train dispatching rules. This is particularly important under 
single line operations, where the train conflict resolution rules need to be seen to be fair 
and equitable to all operators, as well as economically sound.  
 
In contrast, the vertically separated model has been put forward as a way of increasing 
competition in the rail sector, as well as placing rail and road infrastructure investment 
and operations on an equal footing. The main stated aim of the separation of track from 
operations in Great Britain was to ensure competition in service provision and hence 
improved customer service at lower costs. As competition has not yet materialise in 
practice, the benefits of separation may turn out to be small relative to the costs of loss of 
co-ordination and transaction costs, such as contract specification and enforcement ( 
Dodgson 1995). According to Buzelius et al. 1994, the vertical separation of railway 
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functions in Sweden appears to have resulted in a lowering of the quality of service 
provided by the track owner. This model has serious implications for overall productivity 
of rail operations, given the nature of the railway business, with its close independence of 
investments. In addition, the bargaining power of new entrants to negotiate contracts with 
a monopoly track owner acting to achieve commercial objectives, needs to be adequately 
safeguarded. The competitive pressures on train operators, which are being sought 
through this model, are in danger of being absent to the infrastructure provider.  
 
Between the two extremes of total separation and total integration, lies a range of options 
which may provide useful means to achieve competition at the train operators level, 
whilst preserving the benefits of integration. A hybrid model, which draws on the 
strengths of vertical integration, whilst allowing for fair competition between operators, 
may be more desirable. Under such a model, the track infrastructure could be a separate 
business entity owned by operators. Access by new entrants would be open, with charges 
and service contracts partially regulated to ensure fair play. Decisions about track 
investment would tend to be integrated with the overall investment plans of operators. A 
variation of this approach is for a joint-venture company to own track infrastructure. The 
main shareholders in this company would be the operators and governments (national 
and/or regional). Such government involvement could be argued on three main grounds, 
namely: that it would tend to place road and rail investment on a more equal basis; that it 
would ensure that new operators would be treated fairly with respect to service levels and 
price; and that public funds would provide for full cost recovery by supplementing access 
charges based on avoidable costs, since the latter usually cover only a small component of 
total track costs. Under this model new operators, large or small, would be given the 
option to join the joint-venture. In this way discriminatory practices towards small 
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operators, as well as unfair pricing policies, could be minimised without the need for 
heavy-handed regulation. 
 
Under this model the infrastructure owning company would operate on a fully 
commercial basis and would be accountable to its shareholders using common 
commercial criteria. Equity funding would need to be sought on the basis of revenues 
from access charges and/or community benefits set by governments. The relationship 
with train operators would be a purely commercial one. That is, access charges would 
need to cover short-term track damage, track capacity charges if applicable (e.g. peak 
period charges), and long-term investment requirements which are a direct result of train 
operations ( such as increased track standards from new rolling stock). The advantage of 
such a model, relative to the fully integrated government owned railway, is that the 
potential for track managers to move to the most efficient maintenance practices is 
enhanced. Increased productivity can be passed directly to the operator or retained for 
future investment. This may not be the case for integrated systems where the in-house 
infrastructure provider can act as a monopoly able to pass costs on to the ‘parent’ railway, 
and set its own standards. The latter are traditionally conservatively set and hence costly 
to sustain. Under the vertically separated hybrid model, the train operators, as 
shareholders in the track owning company, would be in a strong position to ensure 
productivity improvements took place within the access charging agreements. 
  
The most effective organisational model to be adopted needs to take into account the 
specific aims of the railway organisation(s), as well as the existing levels of efficiency, 
prices and customer service. Freight railways which are efficiently run and operated 
relative to international benchmarks, seem to have little to gain by moving to a fully 
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separated structure. Such performance comparisons, although fraught with difficulties ( 
due mainly to differences in traffic densities, lengths of haul, terrain, and out-sourcing 
policies), suggest that Australian freight railways could be run more efficiently, Bureau 
Industry Economics, 1993. To that extent, it is likely that some form of vertical separation 
would see the entry of operating competitors on selected routes. 
 
INVESTMENT ISSUES 
 
Interdependence of Investments 
 
There are strong interdependences  between functional units in railways because of the 
extent of the joint nature of the production functions, as well as the complex nature of the 
business as a whole. Railway track investment decisions are strongly interrelated with 
investment decisions about other types of rail infrastructure, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
Investment decisions about track capacity may have an impact on operating strategies and 
thus on the level of service provided. For example: track design standards and 
maintenance strategies have a direct influence on maximum allowable axle-loads and 
train speeds; track upgrading including double tracks and sidings or crossing-loops (short 
track sections on single lines to allow trains to cross and pass each other), affect transit 
time reliability and line capacity; terminal upgrading which results in increased train sizes 
needs to be co-ordinated with track infrastructure upgrading; track condition affects 
locomotive and rolling stock performance and maintenance costs; and train control 
technology may require track-side investment and compatible locomotive cabin 
equipment. On the other hand, investment in new technology for wagon and locomotive 
fleets may have a direct impact on track standards requirements, as well as on track 
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maintenance costs. Thus track investment decisions must be part of an overall long-term 
strategic plan designed to achieve an organisation's goals and staged over time to 
maximise their benefit. Under the vertically separated model, such decisions need to be 
taken in a spirit of co-operation between the main operators and the infrastructure 
supplier.  
 
In Australia, for example, there is a considerable investment shortfall in rail infrastructure 
for the strategically important national links, which are almost exclusively made up of 
single line track. Those links, which are shown in Figure 4, require annual investment of 
the order of $A150 million over the 20 year period to 2015 ( in 1995 dollars). This 
investment is needed to improve the level of service provided by operators (Bureau of 
Transport & Communications Economics 1995). The major benefits of such investment 
will be in the form of reduced train operating costs, and increased business opportunities 
stemming from lower transit times and higher reliability of arrivals.  
 
With a vertically integrated railway management model, the task of developing a medium 
to long-term investment plan in which the interdependence of projects is explicitly 
recognised, is made considerably easier.  
 
 
Road and Rail Investment Appraisal 
 
If economic efficiency in the allocation of resources between road and rail is desired, then 
the same means of investment evaluation need to be adopted. Road planning agencies 
currently evaluate road projects on the basis of social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA), 
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potentially capturing the actual benefits of reductions in road vehicle operating costs, 
personal travel time, road accidents, congestion costs and environmental costs. Miller & 
Tsolakis 1993, proposed a SCBA model to evaluate multi-modal infrastructure provision 
and demonstrated its application for the Australian national highway system. 
 
One of the main reasons for the  vertical separation of Swedish railways, was to permit 
road and rail to be placed on an equal investment and pricing basis (Jansson & 
Cardebring 1989). With respect to cost recovery in both road and rail sectors, Nilsson 
1992, advocated reducing the relative price of rail to offset under-recovery of full 
marginal social costs from heavy road vehicles in Sweden. As a 'second best' approach, 
this is comparable to the argument for urban public transport subsidies (to offset fare-box 
shortfalls) so as to reduce urban road vehicle congestion costs. Whatever railway 
organisational and ownership model is adopted, the major infrastructure projects for both 
road and rail should be subject to comparable economic evaluations, so as to fully 
quantify financial, as well as economic and social impacts. In principle, the use of  SCBA 
in railway project appraisal should not be dependent on the track ownership model 
adopted. In practice, in a vertically integrated railway, economic evaluation tends to be 
undertaken for track and operating infrastructure (such as rolling stock), in an integrated 
way. This makes the results of such evaluations less comparable to road investments, than 
would be the case if the operators are vertically separated from the infrastructure 
providers. 
 
OWNERS AND OPERATORS: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
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The objectives of the rail operators and owners of railway infrastructure may conflict 
because they can have different stakeholders and levels of accountability. Railway 
services operated for profit will be concerned about reducing operating costs and 
increasing revenue (via growth in market share or freight rate increases). Market share 
increases are closely related with level of service which each operator can offer. In this 
respect, transit times and reliability of arrivals have an important part to play. Both these 
two levels of service attributes are associated with track infrastructure design and 
maintenance standards. Therefore, the ability of an operator to perform efficiently, and to 
gain market share, is closely tied to his ability to strike an effective contractual 
arrangement with the infrastructure owner. 
  
Railway infrastructure owners will have to plan and manage their assets according to their 
overall strategic objectives. In the case of public ownership of railway infrastructure, 
there is an obligation to make investment decisions which take account the interests of 
current service operators (sectional/private interest) and the community to whom the 
entity is accountable (collective/public interest). If, as is the case of plans in Great Britain, 
the infrastructure is to be owned on purely commercial basis, the owner has a profit 
maximising strategy which will of necessity disregard the community costs and benefits 
of management decisions.  
 
Whether infrastructure is privately or publicly owned, it is important to ensure that the 
owner has sufficient incentive to move towards the most productive maintenance 
methods, as well as the most effective long-term track standards. This will require 
investment decisions to be made related to assets which might have an economic life of 
50 years (eg. concrete sleepers). Long-term commitments from operators will be required 
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in such cases. There is a danger that existing low levels of track maintenance productivity 
in Australia (Bureau of Industry Economics, 1993), will not be significantly altered if 
owners are left in a position of passing on costs to operators without short-term 
productivity incentives, or long-term contracts.   
  
If there is more than one operator, the infrastructure owner faces potentially different 
demands for track maintenance, track design and capital needs. More particularly, 
different market segments such as freight and passenger services, will require different 
maximum speed and axle-load standards, which have investment and ultimately user 
charges implications. The owner will need to provide a ‘level playing field’ so that each 
operator can gain access to track at the appropriate time and cost. The issue of time of 
access is important for a number of reasons. Conflicts of access to track are likely to 
occur between users who may be competing against each other in the market place. Such 
conflicts are currently resolved according to internal railway rules about traffic priorities. 
The question of limiting track capacity at peak times will involve a user charging system 
which can take into account the risk of delays at such times, as discussed in a later 
section. Some issue related to track design and maintenance, track access costs and train 
operating parameters, are discussed below.    
 
 
 
TRACK DESIGN AND MAINTENANCE 
 
The allocation of track costs amongst users is a major issue given that there is still a poor 
understanding of track deterioration causes, in spite of considerable research effort 
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throughout the world ( eg. Hope 1992). The effect of train speeds, axle-loads and vehicle 
types on maintenance effort is currently estimated without a great deal of precision. 
 
The Bureau of Transport & Communications Economics 1995, estimates that the penalty 
for failing to adequately invest in track infrastructure on the Australian main line 
network, in terms of additional track maintenance costs, is around $A1 billion over the 
next 20 years (in 1995 dollars). According to the Bureau of Industry Economics 1993, 
track maintenance in Australia represented the most significant potential saving of total 
operating costs in 1991/92. There are significant productivity gains to be realised in track 
maintenance through capital expenditure in both the maintenance task itself (e.g. 
mechanisation), and by moving to higher quality, lower maintenance track structures. The 
arguments for vertical separation would seem to be strengthen by the historically low 
under-investment in track, as well as inefficient maintenance practices. A separate 
infrastructure business entity with operators and government equity should be in a better 
position to fund major track upgrading on the basis of access charges and community 
benefits. The infrastructure owner should be responsive to operator’s needs without 
interfering in train operating planning issues. 
 
There is also a need to ensure that maintenance of existing networks is undertaken 
according to a plan which maximises overall net benefit to all rail operators.  The need 
for maximum resource productivity is coupled with the need to improve our 
understanding of track deterioration causes. Research in Australia has shown that there is 
insufficient knowledge within the Australian context of the forces generated by moving 
trains (in particular those with axle loads above 25 tonnes); and therefore of the 
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consequent deformations (static and dynamic) of track components ( Hagaman 1989; 
Murray & Griffin 1993; and Muller 1985). 
  
The model of vertical separation of track dictates that each user be charged track damage 
costs on an equitable basis. When several operators compete for the use of track owned 
by a separate business unit or company, it is essential to know the damage being caused 
by each user, both in the short and long-term. Rail traffics need to pay at least the 
avoidable costs they incur. The common costs, i.e. those which cannot be attributed to 
specific users, tend to be a significant component of total track cost ( UK Department of 
Transport 1993). Track damage related costs are typically less than 5 percent of total track 
infrastructure costs, with common costs making up around 50 percent. The remainder are 
various elements of long-run avoidable costs which can be allocated to services or groups 
of services (Dodgson 1995). 
 
 The infrastructure owner needs to maximise profit subject to satisfying the levels of 
performance required by each user. Such performance requirements may well be in 
conflict with optimum maintenance practices (e.g. scheduling maintenance windows in 
conflict with marketing needs). Binding contracts specifying in detail the outcomes 
desired by all parties, may be difficult to negotiate and enforce in practice, as the 
experience from Great Britain suggests (Dodgson 1995). 
 
Figure 5 shows an optimisation model for conducting the track maintenance planning 
function in the context of the overall rail business. An important element of such a model 
is the explicit inclusion of risk variables to deal with the impact of track condition on 
train transit times, reliability of arrivals, accident/derailment potential, and hence rail 
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business revenue. These risks, which may result from sub-optimal maintenance planning 
decisions, need to be part of the overall objective function to be optimised. Therefore, the 
track investment and maintenance functions cannot be divorced from customer service 
and operations planning requirements. 
 
 As shown in Figure 5, track maintenance needs to take into account the dynamic nature 
of the relationship between track condition and maintenance activity. Equations (1) and 
(2) highlight that relationship. For each line segment, the maintenance activity required at 
time period c is a function of observed track condition during time c-1; traffic related 
variables; risk related variables; and environmental factors. Track performance in time 
period c is a function of the amount of maintenance activity since the last major 
rehabilitation, as well as traffic and environmental factors. 
 
TCc = +
= =
∑ ∑f MA TK AX S et
t
c
t
t
c
( , , , )
1 1
1    (1) 
 
 
MAc = +− −
=
∑f TC TK R AX S ec c t
t c
T
( , , , , )1 1 2   (2) 
 
Where:  
 TC = Track condition; MA = Maintenance activity; 
 TK = Traffic task;  R = Set of risk related variables; 
 S = speed regime;  AX = Axle load regime; 
 t = time period; c = current period; T = ultimate planning horizon; and 
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 e1 and e2 are error terms.  
  
 
In Australia, decisions related to investment in new track, as well as maintenance of 
existing track have been based mainly on engineering factors (Bell and Marsden 1990; 
Murray & Ferreira 1995). The concept of planning future maintenance schedules for an 
entire network based on predicted future traffic task by track segment has yet to be 
implemented in practice. 
 
TRAIN OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
 
Transit Time Reliability 
 
When trains are scheduled on a rail corridor, the objective is to achieve a given level of 
customer service whilst minimising overall operating costs. Customer service in this 
context is made up of several attributes which include overall journey time and train 
arrival reliability. In the context of freight movements, the benefits of improved reliability 
need to be estimated on a train by train basis. Each train is made usually loaded with 
freight from a range of customers and origin-destination flows. The elasticity of demand 
with respect to transit time reliability will differ for each customer, commodity, and 
origin-destination combination. However, reliability of arrivals is a critical performance 
measure for all rail markets. The ability of rail systems to compete effectively relies to a 
large extent on this level of service attribute, as well as on price ( Jeffs and Hills, 1990; 
Fowkes et al., 1991; Industry Commission, 1991; and Bureau of Industry Economics, 
1993).   
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 If operations are conducted in single line track, where trains can only overtake or cross 
other trains at specified locations, the transit time reliability is a function of a range of 
factors. The degree of 'slackness' built into the schedule; the number and position of train 
conflicts;  priorities for each train; terminal congestion; number and nature of scheduled 
stops; and train speeds are all influencing variables. There has been considerable research 
into the optimisation of train operations under a single line regime (Szpiel 1973; 
Jovanovic & Harker 1991; Kraft 1997; Mees 19991; Mills et al. 1991; Kraay et al. 1991; 
Higgins et al. 1995a). All of these authors resolve the crossing/passing of trains so as to 
minimise some objective function. The calculated optimal schedule may only be optimal 
if no delays occur to the train operations. In contrast, there has been very little research 
which considers what happens to the schedule if unexpected delays occur. It is under such 
conditions that congestion related access charges need to be estimated. 
 
Track Investment - Train Reliability Nexus 
 
When the flow of trains is near capacity, the system is unstable due to unexpected delays. 
A rail line with low risk of unexpected delay will be able to operate near capacity with 
very little instability. Analytically based models designed to quantify the amount of delay 
risk associated with: (a) each track segment; (b) each train; and (c) the schedule as a 
whole, are presented in Higgins et al. 1995b. A schedule which is planned to minimise 
overall operating cost is not necessarily optimum from the viewpoint of overall net 
benefit to operators. This is particularly the case when the schedule is easily disrupted 
through small delays to individual trains. Rail systems have a major interest to 
determining the risk associated with either a given schedule, or additional train services. 
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This is particularly important in the case of the vertically separated railway, with multiple 
train operators using common track corridors and potentially causing delays to each other.  
Delay risk may be analysed further to determine which trains are most vulnerable to 
delays, or which track segment(s) cause the most instability to the schedule. Such analysis 
is particularly relevant if new operators wish to use congested track segments. Figure 6 
shows an example of a single track operation with x sidings and x trains during a 24-hour 
period. New entrants, who wish to operate trains between xx hrs. and xx hrs., could 
impose considerable risk delay costs on existing users, given the current level of 
congestion.  
 
To minimise the delay risks associated with a given level of demand, or to cater for 
additional demand without increasing the risk of delays, several strategies are available, 
namely: 
 
 (a) the source of track related delays can be reduced through track investment and/or 
changes to maintenance practices;  
 
(b) Investment in major track strengthening to increase maximum allowable speeds. The 
higher speeds have the potential to reduce conflict related delays and improve journey 
time recoverability; 
 
(c) Investment designed to alter track alignments, both vertical and horizontal, thus 
increasing average train speeds;  
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(d) Investment in additions to the number and length of sidings where trains can cross and 
pass each other. Conflict related delays are directly affected by the number, length and 
location of such sidings. A model to determine the optimum location of sidings for single 
line train operations is described by Higgins et al. 1994; and 
 
(e) Investment in advanced train control and communication systems to allow trains to 
proceed at shorter headways, and with less stops required for safe train operations. 
 
All these strategies involve additional costs to the track owner which need to be equitably 
passed on to users. The benefits of some of the above strategies usually extend beyond 
transit reliability gains. For example, in the case of track rehabilitation and upgrading, 
those benefits may include reductions in overall transit times; reduction in accident risks; 
lower track maintenance costs; increased train productivity from higher maximum 
allowable axle-loads; reductions in rolling stock maintenance costs due to improved 
vehicle-track interaction; and improved locomotive productivity through the use of more 
modern equipment. 
 
Reduced delay probabilities will also result from investments in non-track related areas, 
such as: terminal infrastructure and information systems designed to improve freight 
handling operations, thereby improving on-time departure performance; and new 
locomotives capable of higher maximum speeds and improved self-diagnostics capability 
to reduce breakdown incidents. In order to obtain maximum benefits it is usually 
necessary to combine a number of investment strategies into a coherent and 
complementary package of capital expenditure projects. For example, the gains in 
reliability from track upgrading projects can be augmented by investment in terminal 
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infrastructure to allow faster loading/unloading of trains, and by locomotive investment to 
enable higher train speeds. The costs of the lack of such co-ordination under the vertically 
separated model can be very significant.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In Australia, the inter-State rail freight business is conducted by the National Rail 
corporation (NRC) - a Federal/States enterprise, whose charter is to become profitable by 
1998. There is currently considerable indecision as to who will own the railway track, the 
NRC or the State railway systems, or a new entity. The issue has significant implications 
for investment and resource allocation for the land transport sector, as well as long-term 
rail profitability and performance. As the operator for inter-State freight, the NRC shares 
rail track with the State rail systems responsible for passenger services and intrastate 
freight movements. Priorities for track upgrading will therefore be different between the 
various organisations. 
 
This paper has addressed the issues of track ownership and application of consistent 
investment appraisal techniques across modes. Investment in individual elements of 
railway infrastructure must be integrated with the overall cost recovery strategy of the 
operator. Major railway projects must be submitted to both financial and economic 
evaluation, so that the interests of individual railway authorities and the community are 
considered. 
 
Market share increases are closely related with level of service which each operator can 
offer. In this respect, transit times and reliability of arrivals have an important part to 
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play. Both these two levels of service attributes are associated with track infrastructure 
design and maintenance standards. If there is more than one operator, the infrastructure 
owner faces potentially different demands for track maintenance, design and capital 
needs. The owner will need to provide a ‘level playing field’ so that each operator can 
gain access to track at the appropriate time and cost. The issue of time of access is 
important for a number of reasons. Conflicts of access to track are likely to occur between 
users who may be competing against each other in the market place. 
 
The European trend is towards the formation of rail infrastructure entities as separate 
businesses supplying services to operators, which will draw increasing attention to track 
design and maintenance issues.  This trend has also become evident in Australia, 
especially in the wake of the recent political agreements to increase competition within 
the transport sector. However, it is important not to underestimate the difficulty of 
making the vertically separated railway work effectively in practice.  
 
A hybrid model, which draws on the strengths of vertical integration has been put forward 
here. Under such a model, the track infrastructure could be a separate business entity 
owned by operators. Access by new entrants would be open, with charges and service 
contracts to be negotiated between the parties involved. Some regulatory framework is 
likely to be required to ensure fair play in the area of access charges, as well as treatment 
of new/small operators. Regulation may be required to ensure that the infrastructure 
owner does not abuse its monopolist position, and that access is not denied to small 
operators. In the likely case of only a small number of operators being present, the rights 
of small operators will be difficult to uphold without the presence of an independent 
regulator.  Decisions about track investment would tend to be integrated with the overall 
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investment plans of operators. A variation of this approach is for a joint-venture company 
to own track infrastructure. The main shareholders in this company would be the 
operators themselves and governments. In this way, the need for strict government 
regulation to protect small operators and avoid unfair access pricing practices, would be 
avoided.  
 
Under this ‘hybrid’ model the infrastructure owning company would operate on a fully 
commercial basis and would be accountable to its shareholders using common 
commercial criteria. The advantage of such a model, relative to the fully integrated 
government owned railway, is that the potential for track managers to move to the most 
efficient maintenance practices is enhanced. Increased productivity can be passed directly 
to the operator or retained for future investment. This may not be the case for integrated 
systems where the in-house infrastructure provider can act as a monopoly able to pass 
costs on to the ‘parent’ railway, and set its own standards. Under the vertically separated 
‘hybrid’ model, the train operators, as shareholders in the track owning company, would 
be in a strong position to ensure productivity improvements took place within the access 
charging agreements. 
 
The most effective organisational model to be adopted needs to take into account the 
specific aims of the railway organisation(s), as well as the existing levels of efficiency, 
prices and customer service. Freight railways which are efficiently run and operated seem 
to have little to gain by moving to a fully separated structure. 
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